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The dynamics of coordination in innovation networks 
 
 
Elodie Gardet, Caroline Mothe 
 
 
Abstract 
Despite abundant literature dedicated to networks and coordination, few empirical studies 
address the internal operations of inter-organizational networks. This research therefore aims to 
characterise coordination mechanisms of various forms and analyse their evolution through an 
empirical analysis of six innovation networks. Three main dimensions determine the type of 
coordination adopted by a hub firm: its dependency, prior business relations, and type of 
conflict. The study also reveals a negative effect of a singular reliance on trust. Indirect 
guarantees need to combine with direct guarantees to facilitate hub firm dependence. Moreover, 
the coordination modes and the use of hard conflict resolution mechanisms vary with the type of 
conflict (i.e., project or behavioural). These findings have key implications for research and 
practice.  
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Introduction 
Empirical studies of the internal operations of innovation networks are scarce (Ahuja, 2000; 
Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006), most research focusing on the creation, structure or collapse of 
innovation networks. Yet, beyond these factors, networks comprise various elements, such as 
their ability to facilitate information exchange and expertise transfer while also encouraging 
opportunistic behaviours (Goerzen, 2007). For this study, we investigate coordination 
mechanisms in innovation networks, because firms must interact with others and manage these 
relationships to develop innovation projects. Innovation is key to competitive success (Dhanaraj 
and Parkhe, 2006), but innovation projects entail great transactional uncertainty and exchanges 
of tacit knowledge, requiring strategic efforts to maintain the network and extract value from it 
(Ahuja, 2000; Powell et al., 1996).  
Hub firms expressly function to orchestrate innovation networks. Prior research on 
innovation network orchestration (e.g. Batterink et al., 2010; Dhanaraj and Parkhe 2006) 
typically has assumed that a commercial firm is the focal knowledge acquirer (e.g. Doz et al., 
2000) but has not clarified the unique role of the ‘network orchestrator’ that exerts influence 
without any hierarchical authority (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006). As Winch and Courtney (2007) 
warn, the question of how innovation hub firms operate and the conditions in which they are 
most effective remains unanswered (Batterink et al., 2010). Literature on coordination 
mechanisms highlights factors such as dependence (Gao et al., 2005; Grandori and Soda, 1995; 
Jiang et al., 2008), prior business relations (Jiang et al., 2008; Reuer and Arino, 2007) or the 
type of conflict (Das and Teng, 2002), though only individually (Das and Teng, 1998) and 
without analysing their detailed implementations. To remedy this situation, we investigate 
coordination mechanisms within innovation networks and their development throughout the 
process, thus answering our research question: How do dependence, prior business relations and 
the type of conflict affect coordination mechanisms, their forms and their development? 
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In the next section, we offer a brief review of research into coordination mechanisms in 
innovation networks and discuss dependency according to resource dependency theory (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978). We also address two dimensions that might influence coordination 
mechanisms: prior relations and type of conflict. By examining six innovation networks, we 
compare the coordination forms used by the hub firms over the course of their innovation 
projects and derive an answer to our research question. Finally, we conclude with some current 
limitations and avenues for further research.  
 
Theory 
Innovation networks—which consist of sets of vertical and horizontal relations established 
among various organizations that are orchestrated by a hub firm so it can take advantage of 
invention(s)—offer a fertile ground for understanding the evolving ways firms implement 
coordination mechanisms. A hub firm is one ‘that possesses prominence and power gained 
through individual attributes and a central position in the network structure, and that uses its 
prominence and power to perform a leadership role in pulling together the dispersed resources 
and capabilities of network members’ (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 2006: 659). Having filed a patent 
application, the hub firm calls on network partners to transform its invention into an innovation, 
though in this process, it must regulate the transactions (Powell et al., 1996). The hub firm is 
central to innovation networks and has authority over other members, derived from its property 
rights; unlike R&D consortia, filed patents belong only to the hub firm. Moreover, by 
establishing the network, the hub firm has the most links with all other members (Drewello et 
al., 2002): It holds a central position and is in charge of most coordination mechanisms.  
Coordination mechanisms and innovation networks 
Coordination mechanisms are arrangements among economic entities that govern how they 
cooperate to develop an innovation project (Grandori and Soda, 1995). This definition centres 
on strategic interactions rather than operational ones (e.g. task distribution, communication). 
 4 
Similarly, prior research has proposed that coordination in inter-organizational relations can be 
achieved through strategic mechanisms such as reputation, trust, collective sanctions, working 
groups, procedures, costs and revenue-sharing rules (Das and Teng, 1998; Gilsing and 
Nooteboom, 2006; Grandori and Soda, 1995). In various typologies of coordination 
mechanisms, authors distinguish formal versus informal mechanisms, exchange regulation 
versus incentive or sanction schemes, or transactional versus relational modes. We avoid these 
simple classifications, which seem insufficient to analyse the different forms of each 
mechanism1. Yet the vast number of coordination mechanisms means we cannot be exhaustive. 
Instead, we focus on five representative, well-studied mechanisms: type of exchange and degree 
of formalisation, trust, shared benefits, guarantees and conflict resolution2 (see Appendix 1). 
Type of exchange and degree of formalisation. Formal exchange mechanisms include 
standardised procedures, technical reports, analytical accounting, budgeting and planning, as 
well as confidentiality agreements and contracts (Das and Teng, 1998; Gulati, 1995a; Martinez 
and Jarillo, 1989). Informal exchanges, which are implicit and verbal, instead include the 
creation of joint teams (Grandori and Soda, 1995), seminars, meetings or staff transfers 
(Martinez and Jarillo, 1989), as well as decision-making methods. Informal modes are less 
costly (Gulati, 1995a), increase strategic flexibility and reduce the risk of conflict (Nooteboom 
et al., 1997), but they also require more time to implement (Das and Teng, 1998), which can 
mean product obsolescence in an innovation network. Finally, existing contractual theories (e.g. 
transaction costs, positive agency, incomplete contracts) mainly suggest two measures of the 
degree of formalisation in exchanges: the existence of a contract and the number of clauses, as 
well as the forms of the exchanges (e.g. written and explicit or not). 
                                                 
1
 For example, conflict resolution arrangements include joint resolution (informal), persuasion (informal), coercion 
(informal), sanctions or recourse to a third party (both can be formal or informal, but generally formal and 
contracted). Moreover, some seemingly informal arrangements are written into contracts. 
2
 We acknowledge freely that many other mechanisms (or governance modes) could be studied, especially those of 
a relational nature, such as common culture, reputation or inclusion in social networks. 
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Inter-organizational trust. Trust is an underlying psychological condition that may be 
the cause or result of a specific behaviour (cooperation) or choice (risk) (Woolthuis et al., 2005), 
though it also has been portrayed as an informal arrangement (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Martinez 
and Jarillo, 1989) or complement to contracts (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). 
Variations in risk and interdependence can affect the degree of trust (Cullen et al., 2000), which 
in turn has a direct influence on partnership success (Morgan and Hunt, 1994), especially in 
uncertain environments. For example, in an innovation project setting, trust can induce 
predictions of network members’ behaviour (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994). Because unforeseen 
events are inherent to innovation networks, it is impossible for contracts to be comprehensive, 
so some trust must exist. We consider three possible states: trust, mistrust and no trust.  
Shared results. An essential element of cooperation is the determination of how 
outcomes get shared among members. An equitable division (i.e. each member’s payoffs are a 
function of its contribution) can give project members an incentive to work harder, which should 
improve the overall performance of the innovation project (Kabanoff, 1991). An equal share 
instead implies that the parties (hub firm and members) each receive the same share of the 
outcomes, regardless of their investment. Whether planned ex ante or not (an important 
distinction in positive agency theory), the distribution can be either fair or equal (cf. theory of 
incomplete contracts). 
Guarantees. These mechanisms attempt to prevent opportunistic behaviour (Min-Ping et 
al., 2009) by making it expensive for opportunist members to exit. We distinguish immediate or 
direct guarantees, which pertain to specific assets, from deferred or indirect guarantees, which 
instead affect reputations or future business opportunities. Accordingly, this tool can take 
multiple modes: no guarantees, direct, indirect or a mixture. The direct modes imply immediate 
reactions to members’ behaviours, whereas indirect modes strike a later blow to the 
opportunist’s reputation (Rubin, 1990) or exclude the member from further business 
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opportunities. This latter consequence appears very useful as a guarantee, because firms usually 
join networks specifically to gain business opportunities (Brunetto and Farr-Wharton, 2007). 
Conflict resolution. An innovation network contains multiple possible interactions: two-
to-two, one-to-several and several-to-several (Gomes-Casseres, 1994). If a conflict arises 
between technical partners, another member (e.g. hub firm) can intercede to resolve the issue—a 
notion not previously addressed in network literature. Conflict resolution mechanisms are highly 
complex in innovation networks and must reflect the heterogeneous levels of network members’ 
commitment. Thus it is difficult to give an ex ante description of a conflict resolution 
mechanism, and we followed Mohr and Spekman (1994) to select five mechanisms that likely 
describe multilateral relations in innovation networks:3 (1) joint resolution of a problem, such 
that the parties agree to work together to find a mutual solution; (2) persuasion, which occurs 
when one party tries to persuade the others that a particular solution is the best outcome; (3) 
coercion, such that one partner forces others to accept its preferred solution; (4) sanction, in 
which case a network member is expelled; and (5) introduction of a third party to obtain 
recourse to arbitration.  
In Appendix 1 we summarise these coordination mechanisms and forms, as well as the 
main theories on which they are based. These coordination mechanisms help reveal the inner 
workings of inter-organizational relations, especially innovation networks. Prior research has 
identified the overall potential impact of network dimensions such as hub firm dependence, 
prior relations and type of conflict, but to the best of our knowledge, no studies address their 
separate impacts on each mechanism and its implementation.  
The influence of dependence, prior relations and conflict type 
                                                 
3
 Mohr and Spekman (1994) added domination as a sixth mechanism for bilateral relations. In the multi-lateral 
relations we study, domination is largely indistinguishable from coercion. 
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Three inter-partner relation dimensions are critical determinants of which coordination 
mechanisms are used: dependence (Ambos and Schlegelmilch, 2007), prior relations (Jiang et 
al., 2008) and conflict type (Das and Teng, 2002)4.  
Dependence. In an innovation network, partners share scarce resources, which creates 
dependence. A classic definition notes that the ‘dependence of an actor A, on another actor B, as 
directly proportional to A's motivational investment in goals mediated by B, and inversely 
proportional to the availability of those goals to A outside of the A-B relation’ (Emerson, 1962: 
32). Ambos and Schlegelmilch (2007) show that increasing levels of dependence lead to more 
socialisation and formalisation; other studies (Baliga and Jaeger, 1984; Gencturk and Aulakh, 
1995; Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991) report positive relationships between dependence and 
control. Dependence also influences parties’ perception of the benefits they receive (Doz, 1988) 
and the use of guarantee systems and conflict resolution mechanisms. In dependency situations, 
partners often resort to coercive and punitive actions (Kumar et al., 1998; Lui et al., 2006), 
because asymmetric dependency influences inter-firm trust, which is critical to the development 
of long-term relationships (Kumar et al., 1995). That is, dependency relationships are more 
dysfunctional and less stable than symmetric relationships, so they make it more difficult to 
develop trust. A high level of dependence leads to less trust (Kumar et al., 1995), more control 
(Ambos and Schlegelmilch, 2007), less relationship continuity and less cooperative behaviours. 
Prior exchange relations. Innovation networks can include unfamiliar partners or 
repeated ties with the same partners. With unfamiliar partners, contractual agreements and 
formal mechanisms serve to deter opportunistic behaviour. The lack of mutual understanding 
and trust causes partners to feel uncertain about the future (Doz, 1996; Jiang et al., 2008; Ring 
and Van de Ven, 1994). Prior relations thus can be a valuable asset that enables partners to 
develop relational capability and capital (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Partners invest in relationship 
                                                 
4
 Inter-organizational relations also are affected by other dimensions (e.g. past alliance history, partnership 
experience, cognitive interpersonal connivance, communication, commitment, type of opportunism). Our purpose is 
not to develop an exhaustive list (Jiang et al., 2008) but rather to focus on those that appear the most determinant.  
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building and bear relationship-specific set-up costs (Reuer and Arino, 2007). Familiar partners 
also develop a good understanding of their partners’ procedures, management systems and 
cultures, which can mitigate ex post coordination, conflict resolution or information-gathering 
issues that formal contractual provisions otherwise attempt to address (Reuer and Arino, 2007). 
Relationship-specific knowledge also develops from frequent and intense partner interactions, 
which can enhance cooperation efficiency (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Regular relations increase 
mutual trust and reduce the need for contractual safeguards (Gulati, 1995a), so the partners 
avoid the costs of more complex collaborative agreements (Reuer and Arino, 2007). Gulati 
(1995b) also shows that more prior alliances lowers the likelihood of subsequent equity-based 
alliances. However, Goerzen (2007) finds that the propensity to repeat equity-based partnerships 
has a negative influence on economic performance, particularly in environments marked by 
technical uncertainty (e.g. innovation networks). Thus prior relations likely lead to commitment 
and the development of relationship-specific assets, such as mutual knowledge of partners’ 
procedures and values. Repetition over time also creates opportunities for mutual learning that 
encourage the development of trust (Inkpen and Currall, 2004). 
Conflict type. In innovation networks, partners have individual interests that are not 
necessarily congruent with their partners’ (Das and Teng, 2001). Conflicts, which refer to the 
degree of divergence in partners’ preferences, interests and practices (Hardy and Phillips, 1998), 
arise because of the inherent uncertainty and interdependencies between parties (Mohr and 
Spekman, 1994). Das and Teng (2002) strongly recommend taking this dimension into account 
in analyses of cooperation agreements; because conflicts arise for various reasons, their sources 
affect cooperation in different ways. We consider two main types (Mooney et al., 2007): 
- Cognitive conflicts appear when partners disagree about a task. In innovation networks, 
partners might have different views about the best technical solutions, and to resolve the 
cognitive conflict, they might exchange ideas during meetings (informal coordination) 
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(Amason, 1996). Cognitive conflicts generally improve decision making by fostering 
more mutual understanding (Mooney et al., 2007); 
- Affective conflicts involve personal disagreements, such as power struggles or personal 
incompatibilities over private interests and opportunistic behaviour. Partners’ 
incompatible goals could lead them to try to maximise their private benefits without 
furthering common benefits, such as by adopting opportunistic behaviours to appropriate 
others’ tacit knowledge (Das and Teng, 2002). Even with an explicit contract, firms 
rarely seek legal penalties in response to affective conflicts (Lee and Cavusgil, 2006). 
Moreover, inter-organizational trust decreases when one partner displays dysfunctional 
behaviours (Lusch and Brown, 1996; Morgan and Hunt, 1994).  
With Appendix 2 we summarise literature pertaining to these dimensions and their effects on the 
coordination mechanism(s). Accordingly, we derive the theoretical model in Figure 1.  
Insert Figure 1 here 
Methods 
Despite research into each coordination mechanism, no studies address the dynamic processes 
in innovation networks that may affect their implementation or use; therefore, we adopt a 
qualitative approach to explore these phenomena.  
Case selection 
We opted for a qualitative case study methodology to gain a comprehensive, in-depth 
understanding of which coordination mechanism is best suited to each situation, as defined by 
hub firm dependence, prior relations and type of conflict, as well as over time. The six case 
studies constitute a theoretical sample (Glaser and Strauss, 1967); we took great care to select 
innovation networks of different sizes and in different sectors5 (see Table 1) that also share 
common characteristics (Miles and Huberman, 1994). All the chosen networks focused on 
                                                 
5
 Most prior innovation network studies feature biotechnology or information technologies (Gilsing and 
Nooteboom, 2006). We selected cases from other sectors as well. 
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technological innovation, contained at least three members, were structured around a small hub 
firm and included members of different sizes, including very large firms (see Appendix 3).  
We focus on the hub firms for several reasons. Small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) often form links to obtain access to required assets (Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1990) 
and learn new skills (Powell et al., 1996). By taking a central role, the hub firm gains power and 
influence in the network (Wasserman and Faust, 1994), so the study of its dependence 
relationships becomes particularly interesting, especially for SMEs. Moreover, innovation 
networks typically involve high levels of transactional uncertainty and exchanges of tacit 
knowledge, such that coordination among actors is necessary and difficult. Finally, size 
asymmetry (e.g. small hub firm and large partners) tends to affect the management of alliance 
relations and the coordination mechanisms implemented (Oliver, 1990). 
Insert Table 1 here 
Data collection and coding 
Fifty-three interviews (see Table 2), conducted between March 2006 and February 2008, 
included the members of six innovation networks, including project bearers and financial, 
technical, industrial, commercial and legal members.6 They averaged 90 minutes in length. The 
semi-structured interviews were designed to identify coordination mechanisms implemented by 
the hub firms, so we first asked informants to describe their project and how they coordinate 
with others. Next we focused on coordination modes and prepared a map of each network, 
which informed further interviews.7 The maps helped interviewees describe the coordination 
modes they used with different members. To complement these data, we gathered internal e-
mail exchanges between project members; notes made by the hub firm in progress reports, 
business plans and contracts; and external sources such as Internet and press articles, which 
offered triangulation in most cases. For each case, we examined a range of relations 
                                                 
6
 For confidentiality, we cannot provide the names of the innovation projects. The members—a term that refers to 
an organization, not an individual—are combined to indicate the mean number per year of observation.  
7
 The maps are available on request. 
 11 
(approximately 100 total8) between hub firms and network members. For example, in project A, 
the hub firm contacted 29 technical members: 11 partners and 18 service providers.  
Insert Table 2 here 
To code the data from different sources, we used content analysis procedures (Strauss, 
1987). First, we coded all data into categories, according to our theoretical model (Yin, 1989), 
that reflect the five coordination mechanisms and three dimensions. Second, we created 
subcategories for each mechanism. For example, the conflict resolution subcategories were its 
five modes: joint resolution, persuasion, coercion, sanction and third-party arbitration. Third, a 
second researcher recoded a random selection of 15% of the data (eight interviews). This double 
coding check ensured consistency in the classification of the verbatim comments. 
 
Results  
In discussing our results regarding the influence of the three dimensions on the five coordination 
mechanisms, we detail each one and link the findings to theoretical literature. 
Degree of formalisation. As we show in Figure 2, none of our innovation networks was 
composed exclusively of members with which the hub firm had previous relations. Instead, they 
relied on formal exchanges, such as confidentiality agreements at a minimum, to protect their 
inventions. The level of dependence influenced the degree of formalisation; informal exchanges 
arose when the level of dependence was low, because that situation lowered the risk for the hub 
firm, and informal arrangements reduced any contractual costs. This solution also facilitated 
exchange flexibility and adaptability for the future development of the innovation project: 
If the company with which you work can easily be replaced by another, it is not 
necessary to sign a partnership agreement. A confidentiality agreement is sufficient. 
It is long and costly to draw up a partnership contract, especially if you do not 
posses the required legal competence (Managing director, Transparts) 
                                                 
8
 The lack of precision in the number of relations studied reflects the complexity of the topic. Most interviewees 
referred to a group of members (i.e. technical members) rather than individual firms. 
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With greater dependence, the hub firm found informal arrangements insufficient and 
supplemented them with formalised relations. Formal contracting represented its attempts to 
reduce the risks of opportunistic or defective behaviour: 
You can never know for sure how your partner will behave. Signing a contract 
doesn’t mean that you will be fully protected but it will limit the risks. We’ve been 
involved in partnerships in the past and I know that partners' objectives can change 
over the course of the cooperation. The contract will serve as a reminder of their 
original commitment. This is very important, especially when this partner plays an 
important role for the project (Managing director, Protect) 
The degree of exchange formalisation also changed as interactions developed. A partner that is 
loyal to the hub firm and shares a common vision of the project encourages the emergence of 
informal relations; if conflict arises, the degree of formalisation instead increases. Unlike 
informal discussions, formal exchanges (e.g. contracts, letters, e-mails, written reports) offer 
tangible evidence of how cooperation evolves, and in a dispute, they provide concrete evidence 
for a court or arbitrator. However, we did not observe any development from formal to 
exclusively informal arrangements.  
Insert Figure 2 here 
Trust. Hub firms tend to be cautious when they are dependent and have no previous 
relations with another member. A member with an essential role may be tempted to pursue 
selfish goals and take advantage of its position to impose its vision to the hub firm. If the hub 
firm has a less than positive perception of the member’s intentions, it needs high expectations of 
that member’s expertise and efficiency (i.e. competence-based trust; Zucker, 1986):  
We are well aware that there are significant risks involved when cooperating with 
such a company, but we don’t have much of a choice. I chose these partners because 
they could really help us for this project. They are highly recognised in their sector 
(Managing director, Jump) 
Without prior relations but also without dependency, other coordination mechanisms arise, such 
as guarantees, conflict resolution arrangements or exchange formalisation. In this situation, hub 
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firms often tested how members behave. If the member reaches the objectives set by the hub 
firm and demonstrates high commitment to the project, trust can develop. For example, a 
provider in the Motorisation network agreed to execute additional tasks requested by the hub 
firm, leading to enhanced trust between them: 
This is a very nice project and I think it will be a big success. It is interesting for me 
to be associated with this project because I can learn a lot and it also highlights our 
knowledge. Currently, we are just providers; but by showing the hub firm how we 
can contribute to the project, we hope to become a partner. We must therefore adopt 
an exemplary behaviour (Engineer, Motorisation) 
As Figure 3 indicates, when all runs smoothly in the project, trust develops; if not, mistrust 
emerges. In an exchange, it is possible for trust and mistrust to alternate. For example, 
unfulfilled commitments in the Transparts network turned trust into mistrust. If the conflicts 
related to cooperation are not resolved, the hub firm may even consider the member an enemy to 
confront (i.e. win–lose game).9 
Insert Figure 3 here 
Shared results. The distribution of outcomes, generally agreed on ex ante, was equitable 
in most cases, as we show in Figure 4. This division existed even when the hub firm was 
dependent or had no previous relation with the member. The consensus objective was to 
encourage members’ involvement:  
If you want to work with a company like PSA Peugeot Citroen, it is necessary for its 
percentage of retribution to be equivalent to its input, otherwise you can just dream 
that they'll work with you (Managing director, Motorisation) 
Yet the intangibility of certain resources prevents precise assessments of members’ 
contributions, so other allocation methods are difficult to implement. Distribution rules are not 
static but instead get renegotiated with changes in the hub firm’s level of dependence and trust, 
particularly as cooperative experience with another member increases. For example, with its 
                                                 
9
 Our configurations only include arrangements by the hub firm that favoured progress for the innovative project. 
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industrial provider, the hub firm in the Pinc&pile network shared outcomes proportional to 
financial commitments. As trust increased, the division grew more balanced, though without 
ever becoming equal. Transitions from an equal to an equitable division also occurred when the 
partner’s level of commitment was less important than initially anticipated (e.g. Telescopic 
network). A lack of involvement may relate to free-riding behaviour (e.g. Transparts) or changes 
in the resources and skills required for the project. However, when equal distribution did not 
appear at the start, it was never introduced later, usually to avoid potential conflicts stemming 
from perceptions of injustice by members who had been involved from the beginning: 
You cannot treat a partner who’s been with the project since its beginning in the 
same way as a partner who came on board later on. It would be unfair because the 
risks taken by a partner decrease with the progress of the project. Consequently, 
recent partners cannot receive the same part of the results (Managing director, 
Telescopic) 
Nor was there any evolution toward an egalitarian distribution, for similar reasons; initial 
members would not have understood this privilege, increasing the risk of conflict. 
Insert Figure 4 here 
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mbining direct and indirect guarantees, as Figure 5 shows. The hub firms used safeguards 
to prevent opportunistic behaviours or exit by members that were critical to the project: 
In the contract we specified that the company was to invest in specialised machinery 
and that we would pay them three months after delivery. So if any problems arose 
we would have time to identify them and to react. There were also penalties for late 
deliveries (Managing director, Jump) 
Without prior knowledge of the member, the hub firm turned to direct guarantees. For example, 
in the Motorisation network, a technical partner was required to purchase a highly specialised 
machine to test certain parts; the machine could not test other types of parts and thus represented 
a direct guarantee for the hub firm. Indirect guarantees, mostly based on potential reputation 
damage, also were available, though only when the hub firm was dependent and had cooperated 
successfully in the past with the member. The hub firm in the Telescopic case was dependent on 
its commercial partner and protected itself only through indirect guarantees. It was not in a 
position to act when the member was bought by another firm and left the project: 
This partner did not provide sufficient guarantees. It is a large firm and I was not in 
a position to negotiate. However, I will not proceed like that next time because it is 
too much of a risk: without this type of firm it is not possible to continue with my 
innovation project (Managing director, Telescopic) 
In the Jump project, the hub firm could affect the reputation of members with which it had close 
ties; thus, it used only indirect guarantees with one technical partner that offered commonly 
available, easily substitutable competencies and with which it had previous positive relations.  
The types of guarantee change in the case of conflict or when hub firms reduce their 
dependence (e.g. Jump and the purchase of specialised machinery). If conflict resulted from 
opportunistic behaviour by a partner, indirect guarantees were backed by direct guarantees: 
At the start I did not require many guarantees from this technical member because 
they were not essential to the project. But we had some trouble with them, so we 
decided to add a clause to the contract to include a penalty for late delivery 
(Managing director, Motorisation) 
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In the Transparts case, the hub firm noted its past relation with its commercial partner and its 
low degree of dependency and therefore opted for relations based on trust, informal exchanges 
and indirect guarantees. When that partner filed a complementary patent though (for powders, 
whereas the hub firm’s patent covered solids and liquids), it implemented new guarantee 
procedures and grant back clauses,10 stipulating that the firm had the right to use any innovation 
introduced by members during the project. Conversely, despite any emergence of trust, direct 
guarantees generally were included in the original contract and could not be replaced completely 
by indirect guarantees. 
Insert Figure 5 here 
Conflict resolution. When a conflict situation arose, as can occur at any time in an 
innovation project, the hub firm took resolution measures that reflected its degree of dependence 
and the type of conflict, whether cognitive or affective (see Figure 6). 
First, if the conflict related to the project and the hub firm was not dependent, the hub 
firms all communicated with their partners to resolve conflicts, that is, to ‘calmly solve them 
through dialogue.’ If any issues remained unresolved through discussion, the hub firms 
attempted to persuade other members to adopt their own choices. Only if this solution failed to 
satisfy all members would it lead to a loss of motivation and thus the risk of opportunistic 
behaviour. 
Second, when conflict related to the project but the hub firm was dependent, its patents 
could not guarantee that the hub firm had bargaining power, so the persuasion flows reversed, 
from member to hub firm. The influential member would convince the hub firm to adopt a 
solution favourable to its own interests. For example, in the Jump project, the technical partner 
chose the materials that best served its interest. 
                                                 
10
 A grant back clause is a ‘provision in a licensing agreement under which the licensee is required to disclose and 
transfer all improvements made (including related know-how acquired) in the licensed technology during the 
licensing period’ (http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/grant-back-clause.html). 
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Third, for cooperation conflict with a non-dependent hub firm, such that the partner 
displays minimal commitment and acts opportunistically, the hub firm generally prefers exit by 
the member, because it can select another partner. This sanction is faster than engaging in 
lengthy discussions, which could affect the project’s progress. Replacing a member also is no 
more expensive than rebuilding a relation destroyed by treachery. 
Fourth, when the hub firm was dependent and faced conflict linked to cooperation, it 
used coercion or a third party to resolve the conflict. Its dependence means the hub firm must 
rely on still other members; together, they all force the defaulting member to surrender. In 
addition, it may also appeal to an arbitrator, if this route has been specified in the contract. 
Otherwise, it would appeal to the courts and allow a third-party judge to settle the dispute. Such 
arrangements leave little hope of reviving cooperation, as both the Pinc&pile and Transparts 
cases showed. In both cases, the defaulting member exited, but the procedure entailed two 
challenges: It is long—legal proceedings can even exceed the duration of the project—and it is 
costly, especially for small firms. However in some cases, the hub firm must turn to this method 
because the contract did not contain an arbitration clause or the conflict involved betrayal. 
Insert Figure 6 here 
Discussion  
Whereas previous work on innovation networks has focused on one or two coordination modes 
and used a static approach, we adopt a more integrative and dynamic perspective to analyse how 
hub firms coordinate their networks.  
Risk of low formalisation  
Trust as a complement to formal mechanisms. By accounting for the role of dependence and 
the potentially negative influence of prior relations, this study adds nuance to the debate about 
the relationship between contracts and trust (Poppo and Zenger, 2002). A widespread 
assumption holds that trust correlates positively with successful cooperation and, though it may 
fluctuate (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994), generally increases the level of partner satisfaction (Lei 
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and Slocum, 1992). However, this study shows that it also can turn into mistrust, such that trust 
and mistrust are endpoints on a continuum (Lewicki et al., 1998). The level of trust needed 
between members is difficult to determine (Hamel, 1991) and maintain: Either too much or too 
little trust leads to poor resource and skill transfers (De Wever et al., 2005), which have 
significant consequences for both the project and the hub firm. Some authors (Gao et al., 2005; 
Kumar et al. 1995) consider this question as a function of the degree of dependence between 
members. Although trust strengthens the level of commitment (Cullen et al., 2000), which might 
intensify the degree of dependence (Das and Teng, 2001), our case studies reveal that the degree 
of dependence is secondary. Instead, previous business relations play a more important role for 
promoting trust (Goerzen, 2007; Gulati, 1995b). As do Dyer and Singh (1998), we have 
observed that prior successful relations facilitate trust. In all six cases, trust and formalisation 
are not systematically linked.  
In this sense, we consider two streams of literature. First, challenges to the excessive use 
of transactional modes lead to calls to use socio-cognitive modes such as trust instead 
(Nooteboom et al., 1997; Woolthuis et al., 2005). In this case, trust represents an informal 
arrangement, though some authors also maintain its complementary nature with contractual 
arrangements (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Martinez and Jarillo, 1989; Poppo and Zenger, 2002). 
Second, trust appears as a coordination mode, complementary to exchange formalisation 
(Langfield-Smith and Smith, 2003). Thus it could be a specific mode of control (Inkpen and 
Currall, 2004) or a contextual variable that influences the level of formalisation (Das and Teng, 
1998; Ring and Van de Ven, 1994).  
Our study reveals trust as complementary to and not substitutable with formal 
coordination modes. Establishing an exchange relationship based solely on trust could prove 
dangerous (e.g. Pinc&pile, Transparts), leading to wasted time and weak motivation. 
Furthermore, a detailed contract does not appear detrimental to cordial behaviour or trust (Lee 
and Cavusgil, 2006), contrary to the idea that high formalisation destroys trust or exacerbates 
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conflicts (Nooteboom et al., 1997; Woolthuis et al., 2005). In the six innovation networks we 
studied, contracts instead facilitate trust, because drawing up the contract required frequent 
exchanges. This lengthy negotiation phase offered members an opportunity to communicate, get 
to know one another, and express their motivations and objectives. 
Perhaps our results reflect the relatively small size of all six hub firms. Research with a 
relational perspective (e.g. Dyer and Singh, 1998; Gulati, 1995a) suggests a de-emphasis on 
contracts, such that partners switch from contractual to relational coordination, when there is a 
high level of goodwill trust and mutual expectations of reciprocity (Zucker, 1986). Our results 
offer a different perspective: We found no evidence that positive goodwill trust dynamics reduce 
the importance of contracts. Rather, trust clearly is a complement to formal modes. Thus, 
Proposition 1a: In an innovation network with a small hub firm, a sole reliance on trust, 
even if prior relationships have been successful, has negative consequences. 
Our results challenge the role of trust as the social glue that keeps members together (Faems et 
al., 2008). Unlike previous research that suggests that poor goodwill trust contributes to 
partnership dissolution (Arino and de la Torre, 1998; Doz, 1996), we observe no such effects. In 
the Jump and Protect projects for example, regardless of their negative goodwill trust dynamics, 
the partners negotiated new contracts involving the same members. Hub firms explained their 
decision by describing their technological dependence on a competent partner that could ensure 
project success (Faems et al., 2008). These findings suggest that competence trust (Nooteboom 
2007; Zucker, 1986), or a belief in the partner’s ability to meet expectations, might be more 
important than goodwill trust. Thus, we propose: 
Proposition 1b: In an innovation network, relying on competence trust benefits the 
project more than relying on goodwill trust. 
Insufficient indirect guarantees. The guarantees we found were not limited to financial 
guarantees but also extended to specialised assets and brand image. In uncertain environments, 
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such assets modify the degree of interdependence (Thomke and Kuemmerle, 2002). By forcing a 
member to invest in specific assets, the hub firm can increase the member’s dependency while 
decreasing its own (Dyer and Singh, 1998). Using its central position within the network, the 
hub firm also can influence members’ reputations and future business opportunities. The more 
dependent the hub firm, the more it tended to protect itself using a combination of direct and 
indirect guarantees. If the partner brought key resources to the project, guarantees tended to 
include both investments in specific machines or financial delay penalties and threats of reduced 
future business opportunities; the hub firm’s main objective was to minimise the risk of partner 
exit. We thus confirm the need for multiple guarantees in non-recurrent transactions: 
Proposition 1c: In an innovation network with a highly dependent hub firm, a 
combination of direct and indirect guarantees can advance the project. 
Sense of justice in equitable distribution  
The equitable distribution of outcomes is more effective for curbing opportunistic behaviour 
(Das and Teng, 1998; Gulati, 1995b), because it binds members to the hub firm and network. A 
member probably will not risk jeopardising its relationship by exploiting the hub firm’s specific 
investments if it has an equal stake in the project (Das and Rahman, 2010). Before launching the 
project, the members agree on the returns they will receive, and an equitable distribution appears 
to be the preferred solution (Jap, 2001), especially in innovation networks characterised by high 
uncertainty. Equity also offers a means to legitimise the resource allocation, because the issue of 
fairness persists throughout the project’s lifecycle, particularly because the sense of distributive 
justice is critical in innovation networks. Equitable distribution as an incentive can promote 
project performance (Jap, 2001; Kabanoff, 1991). An opportunistic member cannot expect 
cooperation from the hub firm in its withdrawal process and will find it difficult to recover its 
equity stake. That is, ‘The value of the tied-up equity that an opportunistic partner risks losing 
would raise the required threshold of economic gains from opportunism’ (Das and Rahman, 
2010: 64). Thus: 
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Proposition 2: In innovation networks, equity distribution decreases the risk of partner 
opportunism and advances the project. 
Compromise in conflict resolution 
Conflict resolution modes vary with the degree of dependence and type of conflict. For Kozan et 
al. (2006), the way to manage conflict depends on the level of investment made by the parties to 
the exchange, which can be linked to the level of dependence, regardless of the type of conflict. 
However, the type of conflict also has a major impact. For example, in our case studies, if the 
conflict related to the project, the conflict resolution mechanism proceeded along the five 
mechanisms, as theorised in prior research: Members started by negotiating before turning to 
harsher techniques (Mohr and Spekman, 1994) such as coercion or sanction. However, this 
prediction was not supported when the conflict related to the cooperation itself (e.g. Pinc&pile), 
in which case the hub firm used the most drastic solutions available and took the partner to 
court. Thus: 
Proposition 3a: In innovation networks, hard conflict resolution mechanisms are better 
suited to conflicts related to cooperative dimensions. 
Tuten and Urban (2001) also extend Mohr and Spekman’s (1994) model to include the previous 
relations as a potential moderating variable; they posit that resolution methods are softer when 
partners previously have been in a long-term relationship. In our innovation networks, previous 
relationships did not have a significant effect on conflict resolution mechanisms though. In both 
cases that featured hard conflict resolutions, the hub firm had an existing, long-term partnership 
with the members. The type of conflict and degree of dependency seemed to have more 
influence on the resolution mechanism used:  
Proposition 3b: In innovation networks, hard conflict resolution mechanisms are better 
suited to conflicts including a hub firm with a low level of dependency 
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Finally, conflicts erode trust and reduce employee satisfaction, which tends to delay the 
project and undermine the level of commitment to the relationship (Cullen et al., 1995). The 
complexity of these emotionally charged phenomena is difficult to grasp just with contractual 
theories, which offer only two conflict resolutions: revocation (exit) or court. In reality, our case 
studies show that other mechanisms, such as joint resolution, are common, provided that each 
party accepts the dialogue or persuasion techniques. If a conflict arises between a hub firm and a 
technical partner, the hub firm may call on another technical member to lead the focal partner in 
the desired direction (Motorisation). Such a situation has not been considered in prior literature, 
which instead usually focuses on bilateral relations (Mohr and Spekman, 1994). We offer: 
Proposition 3c: In innovation networks, the use of another network member as an 
arbitrator can facilitate conflict resolution. 
Conclusion  
This in-depth study reveals several aspects of innovation networks that previously have 
remained unstudied. We investigate the impact of three dimensions (hub firm dependence, 
previous business relations, type of conflict) on five coordination mechanisms. The degree of 
formalisation and trust vary depending on the existence of previous positive relationships; the 
distribution of outcomes and guarantees instead vary with the hub firm’s level of dependence. 
Our results offer additional knowledge about not only these five coordination mechanisms but 
also their different forms and how they develop during the course of the innovation project. We 
suggest several generalisations of these results.  
1. Exchange formalisation. Contracts are inherently incomplete in innovation networks. 
Extending incomplete contract theory (Grossman and Hart, 1986), we find that it is not 
always beneficial to draw up a more exhaustive contract; beyond a certain point, the 
marginal cost of adding clauses increases beyond the benefits. Instead, informal 
exchanges are appropriate when the level of dependence was low, because the level of 
risk for the hub firm is limited. 
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2. Trust and formalisation. In our case studies, trust and contractual arrangements are 
complementary, not substitutes for each other.  
3. Guarantees. Reputation provides a common tool, perhaps due to the small size of the hub 
firms in our sample, to threaten damage to a defaulting or opportunistic member. 
4. Conflict resolution. Literature on inter-organizational cooperation suggests that 
discussion leads to cooperation. In innovation networks, this solution works only if all 
members are satisfied; otherwise, it can harm the project by creating delays and 
frustration. Conflict literature also identifies neglect as a possible solution (Turnley and 
Feldman, 1999). In innovation networks, especially during development phases that face 
major time constraints, this practice did not emerge, despite its apparent frequency in 
other settings (e.g. franchise relations). 
Research implications also emerge from these theoretical discussions. Unlike other forms of 
cooperation (e.g. R&D consortia, exploration partnerships), innovation networks resort almost 
exclusively equitable distribution, though the distribution varied somewhat according to the 
nature of the innovation being undertaken. In our cases, patents already had been filed; in more 
fundamental research projects, the resources and contributions of each member would be more 
difficult to define precisely (Gilsing and Nooteboom, 2006). It would be interesting to analyse 
whether guarantee mechanisms differ in innovation networks that include competitors (i.e. 
coopetition). Reputation threats or cultural integration could play much more important roles, 
because competitors operate in the same economic environment and are often culturally close. 
Finally, testing our propositions in a sample that includes both small and large hub firms could 
reveal the coordination mechanisms that are unique to SMEs. 
Our results have managerial implications as well, especially in terms of how hub firms 
select coordination mechanisms. Their degree of dependency and experience in previous 
positive relationships with the network members should lead hub firms to pursue a strategic 
combination of the coordination mechanisms. They also should allow for evolution in their 
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tactics as conflicts arise and the project progresses. Our study offers a practical way to manage 
such innovation networks. Hub firms, especially small ones, should be very careful when 
implementing coordination modes to stabilise their network and promote project success.  
Finally, our study suffers from several limitations. First, we analysed a specific context 
in which the hub firm had registered the patent(s). These hub firms were all European, and it 
may not be possible to generalise the results to other hub firms, especially in other countries 
with different intellectual property laws and cooperation mechanisms. Second, we did not 
address the intensity of the innovation. The degree of uncertainty in the network increases with 
the degree of novelty, so coordination mechanisms likely vary according to the type of 
innovation. Third, we analysed only the hub firm’s degree of dependence, without studying the 
degree of dependence of other members. Further research should note dependence throughout 
the network to shed further light on these aspects. Quantitative studies also could use more 
refined Likert scales to measure coordination mechanisms and the degree of dependence.  
Along with these extensions, further research should recognise that coordination 
mechanisms appear in other types of networks too (e.g. clusters, R&D consortia), so a 
comparison of the different forms of cooperation could provide additional insights into the 
coordination mechanisms that underlie each form. Such investigation could verify the relevance 
of the mechanisms in heterogeneous contexts. Some forms might develop in less uncertain 
environments or settings with low strategic stakes; they also might vary according to the type of 
financing. We call for research that studies whether the mechanisms shift with the presence of 
multiple hub firms (e.g. architect, lead operator and caretaker). Other dimensions that may 
influence the coordination mechanisms include the hub firm leader’s personality and/or personal 
networks, which support the maintenance of a reasonably varied, large pool of potential 
members eligible for more tightly coupled, action-oriented networks (Grandori and Soda, 1995). 
Finally, research could note the structural properties of innovation networks and thus add to 
understanding of density or connectivity in innovation networks—properties that likely affect 
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the development of trust and conflict levels.11 We thus hope research continues to explicate the 
way innovation networks can be coordinated. 
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Figure 1 Theoretical model of coordination mechanisms  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 (Re)Defining the degree of formalisation 
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Figure 3 (Re)Defining trust 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 (Re)Defining outcome divisions 
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Figure 5 (Re)Defining guarantees 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 (Re)Defining conflict resolution forms 
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Table 1 Six innovation networks  
Project Hub firm M* Subject Business 
sector Characteristics 
Project A 
Motorisation 
SME 
(12 people) 65 
Essential component 
for automobile 
manufacturers 
Automotive 
 
Highly ambitious: very high 
investment and highly technical 
Project B 
Pinc&Pile 
SME 
(2 people) 8 
Product for 
beauticians 
(business-to-
business) 
Large-scale 
retail 
Significant conflict; the 
commercial and industrial 
partners claimed property rights 
on patents already filed 
Project C 
Telescopic 
Independent 
(1 person) 11 
Product for 
everyday use 
Large-scale 
retail 
Stagnant project; oligopolist 
target market leading to 
distribution problems 
Project D 
Transparts 
SME 
(3 people) 9 
Machine improving 
the processing of 
small parts 
Industry 
Opportunistic behaviour by 
commercial partner, with 
complementary patent filed 
without notification 
Project E 
Protect 
SME 
(6 people) 24 Protection for sports  
Sports and 
leisure 
Project running successfully 
without too many problems 
Project F 
Jump 
Independent 
(1 person) 6 Sports material 
Sports and 
leisure 
Hub firm benefited from the 
experience of another project 
sponsor 
* Number of members 
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Table 2 Data collected  
Information 
sources 
Interviews 
Frequency and 
total duration 
of passive 
observations 
Internal data External data 
Motorisation (A) 
13  
5 hub firms  
 5 technical members  
2 financial members  
1 industrial member 
Very frequent 
7 days 
Contracts (7) 
Funding request files 
(2) 
Internet site 
54 press articles 
Pinc&pile (B) 
9  
3 hub firms 
 2 legal members 
1 technical member 
1 financial member  
2 industrial members 
Frequent 
3 days 
Contracts (3) 
File for innovating 
project contests (1) 
20 press articles 
Telescopic(C) 
6  
2 hub firms 
 1 legal member 
2 technical members  
1 financial member  
Not frequent 
1 day 
Meeting reports (8) 
Email exchanges (50) 
Internet site 
28 press articles  
Transparts (D) 
7  
2 hub firms 
 2 legal members 
2 financial members 
1 commercial member 
Not frequent 
1 day 
Email exchanges (25) 
Legal mails from 
lawyers (13) 
Internet site 
12 press articles 
Protect (E) 
10  
4 hub firms 
 1 legal member  
3 technical members 
1 industrial member 
1 commercial member 
Very frequent 
5 days 
Contracts (16) 
Email exchanges (10) 
Internet site 
35 press articles 
Jump (F) 
8  
2 hub firms 
 1 financial member 
2 technical members 
1 industrial member 
2 commercial members 
Not frequent 
2 day 
Contracts (3) 
Email exchanges (20) 
Internet site  
8 press articles 
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Appendix 1 Coordination mechanisms and forms in an innovation network 
Coordination 
mechanism  Mode 
Underlying 
theory Definition 
Formal The use of a formalised, legally binding agreement or a 
contract to govern the inter-firm partnership. Exchange formalisation 
(Lee and 
Cavusgil, 2006) Informal 
Contractual 
and trust 
approach The role of discussion, commitment, and relational capital in the governance process. 
Trust 
The confident positive willingness of one to be vulnerable 
to the conduct of another in conditions of interdependence 
and risk. “Confident positive” means that one will 
purposefully act on the basis of another’s conduct, 
“interdependence” means that one cannot realise the 
expected economic outcomes without cooperation with the 
other, “risk” refers to the probability of loss as perceived 
by the decision maker. The decision to be vulnerable 
occurs when the trustor believes in the trustee’s abilities, 
benevolence, and integrity. 
Trust 
(Mesquita, 
2007) 
Distrust 
 
Relational and 
contractual  
Confident negative willingness to be vulnerable to the 
conduct of another under conditions of risk and 
interdependence. 
Equal Each party receives an equal share of the payoffs—a 50/50 
split.  
Result division 
(Jap, 2001) 
Equitable 
Agency and 
incomplete 
contractual  
Each member's payoffs are a function of resources 
provided (tangible and intangible contributions, costs 
incurred) to the collaboration. Derived from equity theory, 
which states that people judge an outcome as fair when the 
ratio of their own resources and output equals the ratio of 
resources and output of others. 
Direct Contractual  Immediate effect to control the behaviour of members. Guarantees 
against 
opportunistic 
behaviour  
(Brousseau, 
2000) 
Indirect Contractual  
Impact at later time, based on the ability to harm the 
reputation of a member or limit future business 
opportunities. 
Discussion  Relational  Joint problem solving. Different groups come together to find a mutual solution for a problem. 
Persuasion  Relational  Partners attempt to persuade each other to adopt particular 
solutions.  
Coercion  Relational and 
contractual  
One or many partner(s) restrain others from choosing the 
conflict resolution solution. 
Sanction Contractual  Excluding the partner from the innovation network. 
Conflict 
resolution 
(Mohr and 
Spekman, 1994)  
Third-party 
arbitration 
Contractual  A third party (arbitrator or court) provides the solution.  
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Appendix 2 Dependence, prior relations and conflict type 
 
Sources Dimension Coordination mechanisms 
Gencturk and Aulakh, 1995 
Baliga and Jaeger, 1984 
Ambos and Schlegelmilch, 2007 
Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991 
Dependence Formalisation/control level 
Kumar et al., 1995 Dependence Trust and confidence 
Doz, 1988 
Siriam et al., 1992 Dependence Sharing of benefits 
Lui et al., 2006 Dependence Guarantee systems 
Kumar et al., 1998 
Lui et al., 2006 Dependence Conflict resolution mechanisms 
Ring and Van de Ven, 1994 
Inkpen and Currall, 2004 Prior relations Trust 
Doz, 1996 
Lui et al., 2006 Prior relations Formalisation 
Gulati, 1995b Prior relations Trust/contractual safeguards 
Klein, 1980 Prior relations Safeguards 
Reuer and Arino, 2007 Prior relations Conflict resolution mechanisms 
Amason, 1996 Conflict type Conflict 
resolution/formalisation 
Lee and Cavusgil, 2006 Conflict type Formalisation  
Morgan and Hunt, 1994 
Lusch and Brown, 1996 Conflict type Trust 
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Appendix 3 The six case studies 
 
Motorisation. The project emerged as a result of two situational factors: the evolution of regulation and 
the difficult introduction of hybrid vehicles. Greater political awareness prompted new regulations for 
energy savings and environmental responsibility for vehicles. The difficulty of mass producing hybrid 
vehicles created high production costs relative to performance; opportunities to reduce these costs 
remained limited by the use of old technologies (electric motors, batteries). The hub firm selected 
partners and sub-contractors on the basis of their technological capabilities. The technical complexity of 
the project required a lot of R&D, and the total cost (estimated at 5500K€) required many financial and 
technical partners. 
 
Pinc&pile. Regardless of disinfection efforts, the hygiene of conventional tweezers is sub-optimal, so 
Pinc&pile attempted to address a previously unsolvable problem, from both technical (creation of the 
mould) and financial (high production costs, 2€ per clip) perspectives. The project involves the creation 
of disposable tweezers in recyclable plastic. To build the network, the hub firm paid a particular attention 
to (1) prior relationships and chose cooperation with members with which it had already worked, even if 
they lacked a strong reputation; (2) degree of motivation and involvement and (3) skills. 
 
Telescopic. Recognising the lack of hygiene in warehouses in emerging countries, the hub firm thought 
about a more healthy system and filed patents to improve the uses of certain types of packaging. Its 
innovation consists of releasing a straw from the can at the end of the manufacturing process to improve 
the cleanliness of canned beverages. The hub firm chose members according to their area of expertise. 
Telescopic comprised many members, including financial supporters; the investment is estimated at more 
than 800 K€. 
 
Transparts. The hub firm, after two decades of experience in the development of special machines 
(conveyor systems for basic parts to be assembled), moved to realise standard industrial solutions to 
solve or simplify problems related to components on assembly machines. It devised a system of rotating 
cams, driven by a motor, which represented a technical feat. With its great versatility, the invention has 
given the hub firm success in various markets such as automobiles, explosives (with a flameproof motor) 
and cosmetics. 
 
Protect. The hub firm specialised in helping create consumer products, mainly for suppliers of sports 
equipment. The design of the headphone product at the centre of this project included a deformable 
structure that easily adapted to the user’s morphology. The hub firm surrounded itself with partners and 
sub-contractors that provided access to a broad range of resources and skills. Each member assumed a 
specific role according to the allocation of tasks. The potential innovation could be partially modular, 
such that its independent parts could be developed separately and in parallel, according to standard 
design rules and interfaces. The hub firm and partners focused on core activities, such as design and 
manufacture, and thus retained non-substitutable strategic resources; sub-contractors took charge of the 
lower value-added components. 
 
Jump. A ski and snowboarding coach was frustrated by the lack of progress by students in the summer 
season, so he developed a small-scale board to enable training on trampolines. Skiers adopted it quickly; 
they learned to orient themselves in space through repeated jumps and to safely perform compulsory 
figures. The encouraging results of this test phase led the innovator to start a company to develop and 
commercialise Jump as not only a teaching tool for advanced training but also a fun object to help master 
jumps in the air. Member selection mainly proceeded through word of mouth and Internet connections. 
Both ways provided quick solutions, added skills or supported the purchase of equipment through central 
purchasing routes. 
